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P'yongyang Railroad Control Bureau

1. In October 1951, the P'yongyang Railroad Control Bureau, under the direction of the Railroad Ministry of North Korea, supervised the activities of the P'yongyang Railroad Control Office, the West P'yongyang Locomotive Control Office, and the Sariwon Track Maintenance Office. The director of the P'yongyang Railroad Control Bureau was KIM In-kap (金仁早), aged 35, a North Korean Labor Party member and formerly the station master of Sunch'on (127-29, 34-57) (CP-6168).

P'yongyang Railroad Control Office

2. In October the P'yongyang Railroad Control Office, in Taet'aryong-ni (125-43, 39-02) (YD-3524), P'yongyang, had 160 employees. Of this number 62 were conductors or apprentice conductors, and 87 were concerned with sanitation, billeting, and

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supply. These employees were billeted in the former national stock-farm office building in Tangsan-ri, P'yongyang. Their dependents lived in other parts of the country. The trainmen worked about 20 days a month and were on call at all times.

3. The chief of the office was PAK T'ae-san (朴泰三), aged 27, a member of the North Korean Labor Party and formerly a trainman under Japanese rule. His assistants were YIM Yo-su (林麗洙), aged 31, assistant chief of trains, and YUN Tal-chom (尹達吳), aged 34, assistant chief of official affairs; both were NKLP members and worked as trainmen during the Japanese regime. Other staff employees, none of whom were NKLP members, were the following:

KIM Hi-t'aek (金希澤), aged 25, training official, a graduate of the railroad school.

KIM Tok-hwa (金德化), aged 25, sanitation official, a graduate of the railroad school.

KIM Yong-sŏng (金龍成), aged 37, train service official.

MUN Sung-min (文承敏), aged 20, sanitation official, a graduate of the railroad school.

SŎK Nak-yŏn (石樂淵), aged 36, formerly a trainman under Japanese rule. He is a rightist and joined the public security unit during the United Nations' occupation.

YI Sa-sŏn (李查善), aged 22, a graduate of the railroad school.

Political officials in the office were the following:

KANG Tok-su (康德洙), chairman of the NKLP cell of 41 members.

KIM Il-su (金一洙), chairman of the Democratic Youth Association of 80 members.

KIM Kil-nyŏ (金吉女), chairman of the Women's Association of 20 members.

YI Mun-hwan (李文煥), chairman of the Trade Union.

West P'yongyang Locomotive Control Office

4. In November the West P'yongyang Locomotive Control Office was at YD-360260 in Namhyŏngjesan-myŏn (125-39, 39-06) (YD-2931) and had 375 employees. Of the 158 men in the operations section, 40 were engineers or assistant engineers.
5. The chief of the office was CH'OE Chang-mu (崔昌茂), aged 38, a NKLP member and formerly an engineer under Japanese rule. His three assistants, all of whom were NKLP members, were KIM Il-sŏn (金一壽), aged 36, assistant chief of operations, HWANG Myŏng-tok (黃明德), aged 29, assistant chief of general affairs, and PAK In-chol (朴仁哲), aged 37, assistant chief of factory.
6. The West P'yongyang Locomotive Control Office had 10 locomotives and about 200 freight cars under its supervision. Chinese Communist forces operated three of the locomotives and more than half of the 200 freight cars. Three of the locomotives were sheltered in a cave built at the entrance of Taet'aryong-i-ri at YD-358236. The other seven locomotives were in a cave built in the P'yongyang marshaling yard, behind the locomotive control office at YD-359255. Five or six

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of these locomotives were always ready, in the shelters, for operation. The freight cars were scattered in various nearby marshaling yards, most of them around the Pot'ongkang (普通江) station. Seven lathes and two planes, all of Japanese manufacture, were also available to the locomotive control office.

7. Coal for the locomotives was brought from Taepo Station (YD-150175) at the rate of six freight cars, approximately 180 tons, a week. Water was obtained from three wells.
8. In November the locomotive control office had two of four railroad lines in operation. The P'yongyang to Sunch'on line was in full operation, and the Sinuiju to P'yongyang line was operating as far as Anju. Owing to track maintenance limitations, the average train numbered 15 cars, although as many as 35 cars were sometimes operated in one train.

P'yongyang Railroad Control Bureau Training Center

9. The P'yongyang Railroad Control Bureau conducted training centers for the railroad control office and the locomotive control office.
 - a. The railroad control office training centers were at Sunch'on, Yangdok, and Anju. The trainees were scheduled to receive three months' of training, but actually received 40 to 50 days of training. They studied the history of the Communist Party and regulations on railroad operation. Graduates of the training center qualified as conductors.
 - b. The engineer training centers of the locomotives control office were at Kanggye and Songjin. Engineers received six months' of training and assistant engineers received three months' of training. In April 1951, the P'yongyang and West P'yongyang locomotive control offices sent a total of 40 men to the Kanggye center to be trained as engineers.

West P'yongyang Railroad Roundhouse

10. Prior to September 1950, the West P'yongyang railroad roundhouse was at Namgyo-ri (125-16, 38-08) (XC-9923) but most of the facilities were destroyed by air raids. Later some of the remnants were moved to the Sinuiju locomotive district and some others to the Manp'ojin locomotive district.
11. The repair work of the West P'yongyang railroad roundhouse was greatly curtailed in 1951 owing to the Korean war. In 1949 the roundhouse overhauled 97 locomotives, in 1950 the number fell to 42, and in 1951 the roundhouse overhauled only two locomotives. Minor repair work showed the same sharp decline, falling from minor repairs on 91 locomotives in 1949 to 52 in 1950 and to only 11 in 1951. The freight car repair shop was in the process of being moved from the P'yongyang railroad roundhouse to the West P'yongyang railroad roundhouse when the hostilities broke out in June 1950. The facilities of the freight car shop had not been installed by November 1951.
12. The foundry workshop of the West P'yongyang railroad roundhouse had virtually ceased operations by late 1951. The following figures show the effect of the war on the production of the foundry:

	1949	1950	1951
Tons of cast iron :	2,000	1,500	21
Tons of gun metal :	320	200	3
Tons of babbitt metal :	9	10	1

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Wonsan Railroad Roundhouse

13. Prior to August 1950, the Wonsan railroad roundhouse was in front of the Kalma station of Wonsan, but on 1 September 1950 it was moved to Musan (129-13, 42-13) (EB-1873) for safety. The director was KIM Yong-hwan (金童煥), aged 34, a NKLP member. The deputy director was HAN Myong-hi (韓命熙), aged 37, also a member of the NKLP. The major function of the roundhouse was repairing locomotives and freight and passenger cars. Locomotive repairing fell into three categories: special, overhaul, and minor repairs. Special repairs were to rehabilitate locomotives withdrawn from services; overhaul repairs were to examine thoroughly locomotives in operation once a year and to repair boilers and other accessories. Minor repairs were those repairs on locomotives that had been operated for six months, except boiler repairs.
14. The Wonsan railroad roundhouse slightly exceeded the work assigned to it in 1949, but in 1950 the roundhouse failed to fulfill its assigned goal because of United Nations air strikes. The transferring of facilities to a safer place also interrupted operation during the period equipment was being moved. From October 1950 to the end of the year, only nine locomotives were repaired at Musan. This work was done with part of the equipment moved from the Wonsan roundhouse. In 1951 repair work was carried on without definite assignment. Only minor repairs could be made because of poor facilities. By October 1951 the roundhouse had overhauled three locomotives and made 32 minor repairs. The passenger and freight car shop also showed a sharp decline in production in 1951. In 1949 a total of 1,492 passenger and freight cars were repaired, and in 1950 a total of 1,039 were repaired, but in 1951 a total of only 124 were repaired.
15. In 1951 the production of the foundry was almost halted. The following figures show the impact of the war on the production of the foundry:

	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>
Tons of cast iron :	3,600	1,900	49
Tons of gun metal :	345	185	12
Tons of babbitt metal :	19	9	1

Sariwon Track Maintenance Office

16. In November the Sariwon Track Maintenance Office, in Sinyang (125-45, 38-27) (YC-4059), Sariwon, had 820 employees. The chief of the office was KIM Il-sŏn, aged 39, a NKLP member with the rank of major. The maintenance and repair of tracks in the Sariwon area were directed by this office through branch offices. These branch offices were the agencies through which the repair and maintenance of tracks were actually done.
17. In November the Sariwon office was organized in the following manner:
- a. Sections: engineering, general affairs, technical, bridge, storage, and water.
 - b. Branches: Chungghwa (125-48, 38-52) (YD-4305).
 Hwangju (125-47, 38-40) (YC-4283).
 Madong (125-52, 38-28) (YC-5061).
 Unp'a-ri (125-46, 38-24) (YC-4253).
 Hasŏng (125-46, 38-14) (YC-4235).
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Each branch office employed approximately 40 men as track men, between 60 to 90 men as members of the repair group, and between 15 and 30 men as members of the mobile group.

18. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean war, damage caused in ordinary ways was repaired by the track men's group attached to a branch office. However, following the outbreak of the war, damage caused by United Nation air raids forced the Sariwŏn office to add two more groups of workers to each branch office, namely a track repair group and mobile repair group. Each branch office controlled three or four stations, and it was to each of these stations that the branch office dispatched a track repair group to repair damage caused in the station's area by United Nation air strikes. But when a track was bombed so severely that it was difficult for the repairing group assigned to the damaged point to repair it, a mobile group was dispatched to the damaged point and in cooperation with the track repair group repaired the damage.
19. The efficiency of people mobilized from nearby villages to repair damage inflicted on railroad tracks was very low. To refill a hole made by a 500 kilo bomb, about 300 to 350 cubic feet in size, about 300 people had to be mobilized from nearby villages since most were old men and women. But if trained road gangs undertook the same work, 80 men could complete the job in the same length of time.
20. Five men from the Chinese Communist forces were assigned to the Sariwŏn office, one of whom was the assistant liaison officer. Men of the Chinese Communist forces did not participate in construction work except in emergency. In emergency cases the Chinese liaison officer used the Chinese Communist Army transportation unit for construction work.

Chinese Communist and North Korean Coordination of Transport

21. In early November 1951 the North Korean-Chinese Joint Railroad General Headquarters in Anju was headed by a Chinese Communist officer. The office was established to coordinate Chinese Communist and North Korean railroad operations. It had a branch office in P'yongyang and dispatched Chinese Communist liaison officers to all major stations in North Korea. The division of duties between the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans was based on ownership of locomotives and freight cars and not on the ownership of the goods being transported. However, this division, owing to a shortage of Chinese labor, was not always maintained.
22. Between July 1950 and the end of 1951 more than 100 locomotives had been destroyed by United Nation air raids. Damaged locomotives, which ordinarily could have been repaired, were not being repaired because of poor repair facilities. At the end of 1951, 80 locomotives, including 30 locomotives brought into North Korea by the Chinese Communists from Manchuria, were being operated in North Korea.
23. All rail transportation operating through Kowŏn (127-15, 39-26) (CU-4966) is on an irregular basis and trains move during the hours of darkness only. Schedules are not announced until the time of departure, when the next station is notified by telephone. During January 1951 the average number of trains which moved between Kowŏn and nearby points was as follows: between Kowŏn and Hamhung, two trains per night; between Kowŏn and Wŏnsan, two trains per night; and between Kowŏn and Ungok (approximately 126-47, 39-23, CU-0961), one train per night.

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Independent Railroad Guard Division

24. In December 1951 the headquarters of the North Korean Independent Railroad Guard Division was in caves in a mountain at Ch'ilbul-ni, Tong-ku, in P'yongyang. The commander of the division was Lieutenant General KANG (fau). The division's mission was the policing of the railroads in North Korea, particularly near bridges and tunnels, to protect the transportation system from air attacks and sabotage. Each tunnel, for example, was guarded by two squads, one at each entrance, and in some cases there was also a hidden guard post near the tunnel. The discipline in the Guard Division was very strict. If an accident occurred at their post, the guards on duty might be brought before the provost marshal court. In one case three suspects were on trial at the 8 Regiment Provost Marshal Court on 12 August 1951. They were accused of responsibility for a tunnel accident at Tanch'on-gun (129-01, 40-41) (EA-0103). One of them was sentenced to fifteen years hard labor and the other two to eight years hard labor.
25. The headquarters of the 8 Regiment of the Independent Railroad Guard Division in December 1951 was in Songhung-dong (129-10, 40-45) (EA-1411). The commander of the regiment was Colonel PAK Chung-song, and his chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel HAN Sang-p'il (韓相弼). In charge of supply for the unit was SIN Nam-ch'ol (申南喆). The 1 Battalion of the 8 Regiment was in shelters on a hill in Sangp'o (129-17, 40-59) (EA-2436), under the battalion commander, Major PAK Yong-chun. PAK's deputy was CHON Song-kwan, and the political officer of the battalion was Captain KIM Yong-chun. The 4 Company of the 1 Battalion was at Pokkwi-myon (128-49, 40-24) (DV-8472), and was commanded by Senior Lieutenant CHANG Ki-ton. The assistant company commander and political officer was Lieutenant YI Sang-chin. Some of the companies had heavy machine guns or two or three light machine guns, but this was the heaviest armament with which they were equipped; generally there were only four or five rifles per squad, most of them old United States models.

Road Construction, Repair, and Traffic


26. On 1 November 1951 the governments of P'yongyang city and South P'yongan Province issued orders to put into effect over-all manpower mobilization immediately. Orders issued by the conscription department of South P'yongan made all males between 17 and 40 years of age subject to military service. As a part of a regular labor mobilization plan, the remaining male and female population between 16 and 40 years of age was to be mobilized five days out of each month to do repair and reconstruction work on damaged roads. Provision was also made, in the event of emergency need for labor to repair damage by UN air raids, for immediate mobilization, day or night, of all civilians in the required age group by block and precinct leaders. The groups mobilized were to proceed directly to the places in need of repair. Further, responsibility for the reconstruction of a given area was not limited to those living within the area itself but became as well the responsibility of all people available or within call of the damaged area.
27. If a man failed to report for work himself, he was required to contribute twice his required share by sending two others in his place. On occasions of national celebrations everyone was obliged to take part in the ceremonies. Instructions were delivered two days prior to the occasion through the block or precinct leader. Organizations responsible for conducting and supervising mobilization activities in P'yongyang were police stations, people's committees, and section and block leaders. In road construction, however, mobilization activities were conducted by the city construction offices in the city construction section at P'yongyang city hall.

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28. From 12 September to 10 October 1951, about 20,000 civilians, two-thirds of them women, were recruited in Kosong-gun (128-11, 38-35) (DT-2970), T'ongch'on (127-54, 38-54) (DU-0506), and Chunyang-gun, in order to build a road between Onjong-nyong (128-06, 38-43) (DT-2235) and Onjon-ni (128-11, 38-41) (DT-2962) in outer Kungang-myon, a distance of about five miles. The road was a narrow, rocky lane, difficult to construct, and was not completed until 10 October. However, it was not wide enough for trucks, and only carts could use it.
29. On 30 October 1951 soldiers and labor teams under the army started working to widen the road with the help of recruited civilian workers. This work was completed on 25 November. The building of the road was done at night to avoid UN bombing. The road in December 1951 was wide enough for truck traffic. The road was important because supplies to the eastern front from the east-central sector were being transported over it in November.
30. From 21-26 January 1952 the following vehicular traffic moved between Sinanju and Sukch'on (125-37, 39-24) (YD-2564).

<u>Date</u>	<u>Direction</u>	<u>Time of Day</u>	<u>Number of Trucks</u>	<u>Loads</u>
21 January	south	5 to 8 a.m.	26	Ammunition and clothes
21 January	south	6 to 12 p.m.	17	unknown
22 January	north	5 to 8 a.m.	39	mostly empty; a few troops
22 January	south	5 to 8 a.m.	52	unknown
22 January	south	6 to 12 p.m.	14	ammunition
23 January	north	5 to 8 a.m.	47	empty
23 January	south	5 to 8 a.m.	35	half loaded ammunition
23 January		6 to 12 p.m.		no traffic
24 January	north	5 to 8 a.m.	17	troop convoy
24 January	south	6 to 12 p.m.	32	unknown
25 January	north	5 to 8 a.m.	23	empty
25 January	south	5 to 8 a.m.	72	troop convoy
25 January	south	6 to 12 p.m.	17	food
26 January	north	5 to 8 a.m.	36	ammunition
26 January	south	5 to 8 a.m.		no military traffic some civilian trucks.

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1. Comment. Probably the Ministry of Transportation is intended.

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